

not used

(Continued)

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE",
by AYAMARO KONOYE, pp. 104-105.

On the China Incident

1. Prior to my organizing the Cabinet, I had repeated conferences with the Chinese Ambassador accredited to Japan and had exerted myself for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and offered my good offices to the Government, being convinced that Japan and China must be eternal friends and that Japan must help Chiang Kai-shek in his work of unifying China.

2. That a clash should occur between Japan and China soon after my forming a Cabinet, therefore, was farthest from my true wishes. Accordingly, I left no stone unturned in order to save the situation based upon the principle of local settlement and of preventing the spreading of the trouble.

Concerning this situation, three facts must be remembered.

(1) The Japanese Government, far from taking a resolution to start warfare against China, did its utmost to prevent it.

(2) The military itself, although it proposed the sending of troops to China for the protection of the life and property of Japanese residents, always assured that it firmly held to the principle of non-aggrandizement and local settlement.

(3) The results of my efforts to ascertain the policy of the military toward China revealed that at least as far as its leaders were concerned, their policy was not fundamentally different from that of the Government. Consequently I came to the conclusion not that the Government lacked the power to check the military -- under the Constitution, the Government and the military command are mutually independent -- but rather that the military leaders themselves were unable to command the whole military.

3. As the non-aggrandizement policy thus grew gradually untenable and especially when the war spread to Shanghai, I came to think of a resignation of the entire Cabinet to answer for its responsibility, as well as to show that it was contrary to its will. Actually, we gave the matter of resignation serious consideration. However, what would have been the results of the resignation? Is it conceivable that the elements that really led the military, be they the junior officers or the troops on the spot, should have been moved to reflect and to come to act toward the settlement of the disturbed situation? Would there not have been a possibility that they would have set up a puppet government and have led Japan further in a wrong direction?

I felt it my mission, avoiding at all costs further to infuriate the military, to try all available means to check them, and did my utmost accordingly.

It was also to this end that I exerted my utmost to aid the come-back of the KODO (Loyalist) faction. This effort of mine was checked by the military leaders and by certain factions in the Imperial Court.

This being the case, I sincerely regret that I failed to check the military due to my lack of ability, and at the same time I feel a keen sense of responsibility. But I cannot submit myself to an accusation that I, in any sense, approved or supported armed invasion of China.

If I am charged with war crime for the former reason, I have nothing to say; but I am firmly convinced of my innocence if for the latter reason.

Def Doc No. 2224

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

We hereby certify that the document hereto attached,
written by KONOE, Fumimaro personally, entitled "Efforts for
Peace" is an exact and authorized excerpt (P.P. 104 - 105)
from the book which issued by NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN SHA, April,
1, 1946

certified on this 31 day of January, 1947

NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN-SHA (seal)

1-147 Ginza Kyobashi-ku, Tokyo

然れども三つては
し、且そ
統帥の力
より内閣
のいへ
、とも首
みんとす
。する所
の走、且

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

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近衛文相手記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜萃
支那事變に就て

一内閣組織前より駐日支那大使と屢々會合し、日支國交調整に奔走、且政府に斡旋す。即ち日支永久の友たらしむべからず、我も蔣介石の支那統一を支援せざるべからずとの確信を有せり。
二故に組閣後間もなく日支武力衝突延りたることは最初の意に反する所なり。百万局地解決不擴大方針を以て事態を收拾せんと力むたり。
この場合記憶すべき事實は

1 日本内閣としては對支戦争を決意する所か、壓力之を回避せんとす
2 軍自身も在留邦人の生命財産保護を名目に出兵を提案するのみにして、常に不擴大局地解決方式を堅持せる旨を確言す。

3 軍自体の對支方針を明確ならしめんと努力したるも、少なくとも首脳部間の意圖は内閣と根本的に違反せるものと覺えず、結局内閣の軍を抑ふる力足らざりしといふよりは、一而も憲法上の建前よりいへば、内閣と統帥とは全然相互に、獨立なり。軍首脳部に軍統帥の力なかりしと断ずる方至當なり。

故に不擴大方針漸次敗るゝに及んで、殊に上海に戦局及ぶに至つては内閣としては總辭職し以てそれが自らの意に反することを表明し、且その責を負ふことも考へられ、事實眞實にこの問題を激討せり、然れども

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總辭職したる結果如何、軍を事實上動かせる分子、それが青年將校であれ
 現地軍であれ、が之によつて反省し、事態を收拾する方向に行動せしな
 らんと考へ得らるゝや、却て傀儡政府を立て、事態を日本として誤りた
 る方向に益々導く可能性なかりしや、余は飽く迄軍を養成することを避
 けながら、極力他の凡ゆる手段により之を制御することを以て余の使命
 なりと感じて、その努力をなせり、皇道派を復活せしめんと極力努力し
 たるもこの目的の爲なり、この努力は軍の首腦部及一部官中勢力により
 て阻れたり。故に余の力足らずして遂に軍を押ふる能はざりし事實に對
 しては衷心より之を遺憾とし、且その責任を痛感す。然れども如何なる
 意味に於ても支那武力侵略を承認乃至支持せりとの糾弾に對しては絶對
 に之を甘受する能はず。前者の理由によつて戦争犯罪に問はるるならば
 致方なきも、後者の故を以てならば余は自己の潔白を確信す。

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證 明 書

近衛文磨手記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜萃と題せる別添文書は昭和二十一年四月一日日本電報通信社より發行せる近衛文磨手記「平和への努力」と題する書籍の当該頁よりの正確なる抜萃なる事を證明す

昭和二十二年一月一日

東京都京橋區銀座一四七ノ一

日本電報通信社